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Abstract
Power indices methodology of weighted majority game is widely used to measure a priori
voting power of members of a committee. In this paper we present a computer implementation
of the main power indices: Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, Johnston, Deegan-Packel and the Holler-
Packel power indices. This computer implementation allows comparing the different indices.
The system was developed for multiplataform: Linux and Windows. We compute the power
indices for two examples and analyze its results.
Keywords: Weighted majority games - Power indices - Computational implementation -
Multiplataform
Classification: WASI
1 Introduction
Democratic societies and international organizations use a wide variety of complex rules to reach
decisions. Examples where it is not always easy to understand the consequences of the way
voting is done include to elect the President or the Parliament of a country, the United Nations
Security Council, the governance structure of the World Bank, the European Parliament, etc.
The analysis of power is central in these situations. In general, it is difficult to define the
idea of power, but for the special case of voting situations several quantitative measures for
evaluating the power of a voter or coalition have been proposed.
Power indices methodology is widely used to measure an a priori voting power of members
of a committee. Different power indices have been proposed to assess the a priori distribution
of power in voting situations. That is, the distribution of power among the voters for a given
decision rule. The two more popular indices are: Shapley-Shubik [10] and Banzhaf [2] . Other
power indices are: the Johnston [6], the Deegan-Packel [3] and the Holler-Packel [5] indices.
The results given by these indices may differ quite widely. The computation of these power
indices is also complex in practice and requires the use of computational tools.
We will present a computational tool for calculating power indices. This is an extension to
the article by Aguirre, Guerrero, Oviedo and Quintas [1]. We compute new indices (Johnston,
Deegan-Packel and Holler-Packel). The system also allows comparing the results of different
indices and presents statistic reports.
We compute the power indices for two examples and analyze its results.
2 Weighted Majority Games
Cooperative games are used to model interaction among agents or groups of agents when
cooperation it possible. Within this theory, there are several solutions measuring the power of
each agent.
A cooperative transferible utility (TU) game is given by: G = (N, v), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
is the set of all the players and v is the characteristic function. Any non empty subset of N is
called a coalition. An arbitrary coalition is denoted by S, s representing its number of players.
This function v is defined on the coalitions S ⊆ N and measures the value or utility v(S) that
each coalition S has if it forms. Thus v(S) is the utility that the members of S can obtain by
themselves. The meaning of this function is that it measures how much a group could obtain
working together.
Definition 1 A cooperative transferible utility (TU) game is defined by: G = (N, v), where
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of all players and
v : ℘(N) = 2N −→ < is the characteristic function. This is a real function, defined on the
subset of N , that fulfill the following properties:
v (φ) = 0 (1)
v ({i}) > 0 ∀i ∈ N (2)
v (S ∪ T ) > v (S) + v (T ) ∀ (S ∩ T ) = φ and S, T ⊆ N (3)
Condition (1) is only for consistency (the empty coalition has no-power). Condition (2)
indicates that the security level of each player is cero.
Condition (3) is known as Superadditivity Property, and shows the incentives for the players
in conforming bigger coalitions.
In many games (elections for instance) the results is 1 o 0 (winning or losing the elections)
thus we have the following definition:
Definition 2 A simple game is a cooperative game G = (N, v), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is
a finte set and v : ℘(N) = 2N −→ {0, 1}, such that v(φ) = 0 and v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever
S ⊆ T ⊆ N .
A coalition is winning if v(S) = 1, and losing if v(S) = 0. Let W (v) denote the set of all
winning coalitions and m(v) its cardinality. A player i is a swinger in a winning coalition S if
when removed from the coalition makes it losing, that is to say, if v(S) = 1 and v(S−{i}) = 0.
A minimal winning coalition is a winning coalition in wich all players are swinger. Let M(v)
denote the set of all minimal winning coalitions and m(v) the total number of minimal winning
coalitions.
An interesting class of simple games is the class of Weighted Majority Games (WMG). It
is a system in which voters can have different numbers of votes. The number of votes needed
to pass a motion is called the quota q.
Definition 3 A WMG is defined as a TU game G = (N, v), where each player has a finite
number of votes donoted by wi, with wi > 0, ∀i ∈ N .
A WMG is determinated by the structure:
[q;w1, w2, ..., wn]. (4)
A coalition should obtain at least a quote q of the votes (depending of the type of majority
that the decision requires). If we think in terms of the percentage of votes, q could be 1
2
, 2
3
, etc.
We will deal with 1
2
∑n
i=1 wi < q ≤
∑n
i=1 wi in order to avoid having two winning coalitions
with no empty intersection.
In a WMG we have:
v(S) =
{
1
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q
0 otherwise
(5)
3 Power Indices
The power of players can be measured by power indices. A power index is a certain vector
φ = (φ1, φ2, . . . , φn), where φi is interpreted as a measure of the influence that player i (i =
1, 2, . . . , n) can exert on the outcome.
In this study, the following power indices were analized: Shapley-Shubik [9], Banzhaf [2],
Johntson [6], Deegan-Packel [3] and Holler-Packel [5].
3.1 Shapley-Shubik Index
Shapley [9] axiomatically characterizes the prospect of having to play a TU game, referred to as
the Shapley Value. The Shapley-Shubik index (SSPI ) is the application of this value to simple
games [10].
The Shapley Value ϕ(v) = (ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn) gives an imputation, it means a way to distribute
the total amount obtained by the total coalition N , among the players, giving each one at least
the amount each player can obtain by himself and taking into account the average marginal
contribution by being (or not) member of each coalition. It fullfils:
n∑
i=1
ϕi = v(N) y ϕi > v({i})
The Shapley Value is characterized as follows:
Theorem Shapley[9] Let G = (N, v) be an TU game. The Shapley value is a n− vector
call ϕ (v) = (ϕ1 (v) , ϕ2 (v) , ..., ϕn (v)), such that:
ϕi (v) =
∑
S⊆N−{i}
s! (n− s− 1)!
n!
[v (S ∪ {i})− v (S)] (6)
The Shapley value can be given by the following heuristic explanation. Suppose the players
(the elements of N) agree to meet at a specified place and time. Naturally because of random
fluctuations, all will arrive at different times; it is assumed, however, that all orders of arrival
(permutations of the players) have the same probability : 1
n!
.· · · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
|S|!
, i, · · · · · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−|S|−1)!

Suppose that, if a player, i, arrives, and finds the members of the coalition S − {i} (and
no others) already there, he receives the amount v(S)− v(S − {i}), i.e., the marginal amount
which he contributes to the coalition, as payoff. Then the Shapley Value ϕi(v) is the expected
payoff to player i under this randomization scheme.
3.2 Banzhaf Index
A second index of power was introduced by Banzhaf [2], which is called the Banzhaf index
(BPI ). This index is based on counting for each player the number of coalitions to which it
belongs and it is crucial to win.
The Banzhaf index is given by β(v) = (β1(v), β2(v), . . . , βn(v)), where
βi(v) =
∑
S⊆N
S3i
(
1
2
)n−1
[v(S)− v(S − {i})] (7)
The following normalization:
β˜i(v) =
βi(v)∑
k∈N βk(v)
(8)
gives the normalized Banzhaf index, that we denote β˜(v).
3.3 Johnston Index
A measure of power should depend on the number of swingers in the coalition. Johnston [6]
proposes a modification of the normalized Banzhaf index, which is referred as the Johnston
index (JPI ). In a simple game, let ζ(S) denote the number of swingers in a winning coalition
S. We can then calculate γ(v) = (γ1(v), γ2(v), . . . , γn(v)) where
γi(v) =
∑
S⊆N
i∈S
1
ζ(S)
[v(S)− v(S − {i})] (9)
The summation is only done on the coalitions in which there is at least one swinger. The
JPI, that we denote γ˜(v), is obtained by the following normalization:
γ˜i(v) =
γi(v)∑
k∈N γk(v)
(10)
3.4 Deegan-Packel Index
Deegan and Packel [3] proposed an index from the assumption that all minimal winning coali-
tions have the same probability of forming, and the assumption that the swingers in a minimal
winning coalition share equally the spoils.
In a simple game, the Deegan-Packel Power Index (DPPI ) is given by
δ(v) = (δ1(v), δ2(v), . . . , δn(v)) where
δi(v) =
1
m(v)
∑
S∈M(v)
i∈S
1
s
[v(S)− v(S − {i})] (11)
where m(v) is the total number of minimal winning coalitions.
3.5 Holler-Packel Index
Holler and Packel [5] argued that the preceding indices face the problem of distributing the
value of a priori coalitions among their members. There might be no adequate solution to this
problem, because the coalition value is a collective good. The private good approach, as implied
in the Holler-Packel, might be hence inappropriate if voting in not only a matter of allocating
spoils. Holler and Packel[5] proposed a slight modification of the DPPI, which can be derived
from the assumption that all minimal winning coalitions have the same probability of forming,
and the assumption that all swingers in a minimal winning coalition get all the spoils.
In a simple game, the non-normalized Holler-Packel Power Index is given by
σ(v) = (σ1(v), σ2(v), . . . , σn(v)) where
σi(v) =
1
m(v)
∑
S∈M(v);i∈S
[v(S)− v(S − i)] (12)
The Holler-Packel Power Index (HPPI ), that we denote σ˜(v), is obtained by the following
normalization:
σ˜i(v) =
σi(v)∑
k∈N σk(v)
(13)
In the following section we will introduce the computational implementation.
4 Computing Power Indices
This application uses a client-server paradigm [11], [1]. The server is coded in C and the client
in Tcl/Tk [7], [8], [12].
Client software is a Tcl/Tk script that shows a graphical user interface, which can runs
over Unix and Windows platforms [13], [14]. It contacts a server, sends a request, and awaits
a response. When the response arrives, the client shows the results.
Server software which can run over Unix platform. It create a socket and binds the socket
to the port at which it desires to receive requests. It then enters into an infinite loop in which
it accepts the next request that arrives from a client, processes the indices and sends the reply
back to the client.
When solving a problem, one approach is to divide the problem into smaller specific tasks.
Given the nature of the sub-tasks and the sequence in which they be done, we can occasionally
split them out to separated processes and, if needed, to make the processes communicate with
each other.
UNIX provides system calls to create processes, and it is possible to use these facilities to
write parallel programs. We would not get an increased execution speed on a single processor.
Actually, the speed would reduce because of the overhead of creating the processes and handling
context changes as we swap between processes. A much more efficient mechanism is one in which
a concurrent routine is specified that shares the same memory space and global variables. This
can be provided by a thread mechanism or lightweight process.
Each thread has its own execution stack, register set, program counter, thread-specific data,
thread-local variables, thread-specific signal mask, and state information. In a multithreaded
process each thread executes independently and asynchronously. Problems that consist of
multiple individual tasks lend themselves to a threaded solution.
The reason to parallel server programs is to increase the number of computing resources to
more efficiently process the indices (i.e. each player is processed in parallel).
The system allows comparing the results of the different implemented indices. It also gives
a stadistic report of coalitions, the number of swingers and winning coalitions.
5 Aplication examples
We now present two examples where we use the computer program for calculating and com-
paring the above described power indices. The first one is a simple example of a Parliament
with four parties. The second one is more complex and interesting because it models the actual
composition of the European Parliament. It has 732 members gathered in eight multinational
parties. The study of the indices shows the share of power each party has in the Parliament.
5.1 Example 1
We consider a Parliament with four parties, having the following voting structure:
1. Party 1 = 15 votes.
2. Party 2 = 13 votes.
3. Party 3 = 3 votes.
4. Party 4 = 1 votes.
The WMG is the following:
[17; 15, 13, 3, 1]. (14)
Table 1 contains the power indices:
Player Weight % Votes SSPI BPI JPI DPPI HPPI
Party 1 15 46,86% 0,416666 0,416666 0,5 0,333333 0,285714
Party 2 13 40,62% 0,25 0,25 0,222222 0,277777 0,285714
Party 3 3 9,38% 0,25 0,25 0,222222 0,277777 0,285714
Party 4 1 3,12% 0,083333 0,083333 0,055555 0,111111 0,142857
TOTAL 32 100% 1 1 1 1 1
Table 1:
We observe that some indices can give the same result ( in this case SSPI and BPI) while
others give a spread of outcomes. They usually gives a different outcome of the percentage of
votes each party has. It allows different interpretations of the actual power of the groups.
Now we present a more complex study considering the actual composition of the European
Parliament.
5.2 Example 2
The European Parliament (EP) is the parliamentary body of the European Union (EU), directly
elected by EU citizens. Together with the Council of Ministers, it comprises the legislative
branch of the institutions of the Union.
The EP [4] has 732 members. Every country has a specified number of seats in the EP.
Member state Seats Member state Seats
Germany 99 Austria 18
France 78 Denmark 14
United Kingdom 78 Finland 14
Italy 78 Slovakia 14
Spain 54 Republic of Ireland 13
Poland 54 Lithuania 13
Netherlands 27 Latvia 9
Belgium 24 Slovenia 7
Czech Republic 24 Cyprus 6
Greece 24 Estonia 6
Hungary 24 Luxembourg 6
Portugal 24 Malta 5
Sweden 19 Total 732
Table 2: Composition of the European Parliament (June 2004)
However the seats are also allocated as party groups. These parties are supranational and
form 8 politics groups. The seats are allocated every five years by elections in the countrys.
Table 3 contains the results of most recent elections (June 2004) to the EP:
1. European Peoples´ Party - European Democrats (EPP-ED) = 277 votes.
2. Party of European Socialists (PES) = 198 votes.
3. European Liberal Demcrat and Reform Party (ELDR) = 68 votes.
4. European Greens / European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) = 40 vote.
5. European United Left / Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL) = 39 votes.
6. Union for a Europe of Nations (UEN) = 27 votes.
7. Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) = 15 votes.
8. Non inscrits (NI)
The WMG is the following:
[367; 277, 198, 68, 40, 39, 27, 15, 68]. (15)
Table 3 contains the power indices of the EP considering these parties.
Again SSPI and BPI give similar values. JPI gives much power to the largest group . On
the other side, DPPI and HPPI distribute the power almost homogenously among all groups.
Player Weight % Votes SSPI BPI JPI DPPI HPPI
EPP-ED 277 38% 0.426191 0.427273 0.621622 0.222222 0.185185
PES 198 27% 0.178571 0.154545 0.129129 0.106667 0.111111
ELDR 68 9% 0.111905 0.118182 0.077477 0.148889 0.148148
GREENS/EFA 40 5% 0.059524 0.063636 0.033483 0.121111 0.129630
EUL/NGL 39 5% 0.059524 0.063636 0.033483 0.121111 0.129630
UEN 27 4% 0.045238 0.045455 0.023273 0.101111 0.111111
EDD 15 2% 0.007143 0.009091 0.004054 0.030000 0.037037
NIL 68 9% 0.111905 0.118182 0.077477 0.148889 0.148148
TOTAL 732 100% 1 1 1 1 1
Table 3: Power indices of European Parliament
6 Conclusions
The new computational system is a much powerful tool than the system implemented in [1].
The system allows comparing the different indices. It is oriented to WMG making its use
very simple. It also allows drawing statistic reports of number of winning coalitions and swings.
The system have been also parallelized by using thread, for an optimal performance. More-
over, the client software is multiplatform. The users can choose the best available platform
instead of being constrained only to the availability of a specific platform.
Thus we have obtained a support to game theory researchers, as well as to teachers and
students. It has been shown to be particularly useful in complex applications of Cooperative
Game Theory.
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